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As the Midwest gears up to rapidly add new ethanol manufacturing plants, 
the existing regional economy must accommodate these changes.  There are 
issues for decision makers regarding existing agricultural activities, 
transportation and storage, regional economic impacts, and the likelihood of 
growth in particular areas.  Many of these issues need to be considered in a 
simultaneous fashion. 
 
This paper describes our ongoing model development for determining the 
optimal placement of new ethanol plants based on the availability of 
feedstocks within a defined geographic territory.  One of the model’s 
intended applications is to explore the limits of statewide or regional ethanol 
production and its potential economic value to the regional economy.  
Toward that end, we first address the issue of determining reliable and 
credible biofuels-related job impacts.  Next, in the second phase of our 
research, current or future levels of local demand for biofuels inputs (corn, 
currently) and processing plants are factored into the model to account for 
competing uses in space.  The GIS-dependent application iteratively places 
new plants until the supply of available feedstocks in the study region no 
longer meets the threshold level required to sustain additional plants.  This 
model allows manipulation of the various assumptions so that many different 
policy and economic scenarios can be assessed.  Last, we will combine the 
results to determine where and by how much we might expect the ethanol 
industry to grow in our region. 
 
This is an applied research and planning exercise designed to figure out the 
pace, pattern, and outcomes of rapid growth in the number of corn-supplied 
ethanol plants in Iowa and in particular sub-regions of the state.  This 
process also has application to future biomass development scenarios as 
credible technical information emerges about agricultural production and 
about the future ethanol industry. 
                                                 
* Paper prepared for the 46
th Annual Meeting of the Southern Regional Science 
Association, Charleston, SC.  March 29-31, 2007. 




Iowa is in the midst of a radical change in the use to which its most prevalent 
agricultural commodity, corn, is being put.  An ethanol production boom has 
led to rapid-fire ethanol plant development across the state, further yielding 
multiple regional economic research, planning, and policy development 
challenges.   The state’s ethanol production capacity nearly doubled between 
2003 and 2004, doubled again between 2004 and 2005, and increased 
another 60 percent between 2005 and 2006.   Construction of new plants 
continues.   
 
As production capacity grew, so grew the public awareness of the biofuels 
industry.  Judging from the number of ethanol-related newspaper stories 
indicated in Figure 1, public interest in ethanol spiked sharply in 2006.  
Announcements of new ethanol plant proposals, on-going ethanol plant 
construction updates, and other ethanol-related stories were frequently 
found in Iowa’s daily newspapers during 2006.   
 
Figure 1 


















A combination of economic, global, and political factors also helped feed the 
state’s interest in ethanol.  A federal mandate re-authorizing tax credits of 
$.51 per gallon for 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol production certainly helped 
fuel growth.   Higher gas prices especially after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
and again during the summer of 2006, piqued the public interest in and the 
perceived need for alternative fuels.  The phased-in use of ethanol to replace 
MTBE as a fuel additive in several regions of the U.S. led to sharp spikes in 
the price of ethanol during the summer of 2006, and Mideast and other 
international issues involving producers like Venezuela and Nigeria kept 
crude oil prices very high for much of last year.
*  Profits in the industry were 
                                                 
* Ethanol is a viable substitute for gasoline, and its price will track closely to gasoline 
prices, so if gasoline prices are high, the price for ethanol will generally follow, 
provided of course that demand and supply are in concordance.  The energy value of 
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reported to be very high.  The industry does best when gasoline prices are 
high and corn prices are low.  
 
In Figure 2 we see that by November, 2006, a huge run-up in expected 
demand for corn from this booming industry led to much higher corn prices.  
The jump in corn prices coincided with a major spike in ethanol-related news 
stories.  Notably, gasoline prices declined sharply at that time – an offset to 
the ostensible profitability of ethanol plants.  Currently the pace of new plant 
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In the earlier stages of this boom in both public support and plant 
construction, politicians, local policy makers, and economic developers hailed 
the emerging industry as the right and proper evolution of modern 
agricultural production capacities coupled inexorably with for-sure-just-
around-the-corner technological breakthroughs and long overdue changes in 
the nation’s energy policies.   
 
Amidst all of this enthusiasm, biofuels trade associations reported in various 
venues that thousands and thousands of jobs had been created across the 
Corn Belt, politicians and government agency representatives parroted those 
claims uncritically, state governments began to specifically apply agency 
services in support of the boom and offer lucrative tax credits and incentives 
to promote even faster growth, land-grant universities promoted their vital 
scientific contributions in this coming energy revolution, cities and counties  
scrambled to be the site of a modern ethanol factory – to be on the winning 
                                                                                                                                                 
ethanol is roughly two-thirds of gasoline, so price without subsidy would be expected 
to be two-thirds the price of gasoline. 
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side for a change, and rural leaders in Iowa started talking about a rural 
renaissance.  All from ethanol. 
 
Within this cycle of what a non-Corn Belt observer might see as irrational, if 
not more accurately parochial, exuberance, several questions and concerns 
emerged:   
 
•  The rhetoric of job growth claims by politicians and trade groups clearly 
did not square with reality.   Despite claims of thousands and thousands 
of job impacts, rural areas simply were not realizing the promised gains 
made by trade groups and political leaders.  Dozens of jobs, maybe, but 
not the hundreds that folks were told to expect. 
  
•  The number of announced new projects, were they to be constructed, 
would literally wipe out the region’s corn exports and more – there was an 
ostensible future demand for corn that simply could not be met by current 
and even reasonable projections of future corn production.   
 
•  Planned expansions in corn production would have spatial ripple effects on 
soybean, wheat, and other small grain production that could disrupt the 
grain markets and processors across several states.   
 
•  Environmental concerns emerged as higher corn prices induced removing 
land from Conservation Reserve Program participation, the conversion of 
pasture and hay land to crop land, and more continuous cropping of corn, 
which is both energy and chemically intensive and leads to higher rates of 
soil erosion and other degradations of the environment. 
 
•  In much of the Midwest swine and poultry producers, primarily, rely on 
corn for feed and tend to be concentrated in the most desirable locations 
for ethanol plants.  The animals that are most compatible with ethanol 
plant byproducts, feeder cattle, are concentrated in the western and 
southern Plains.   
 
•  The vast grain handling infrastructure that had evolved over decades to 
store, broker, and move corn out of the Midwest to the coasts and down 
the Mississippi river would rapidly become inefficient as more and more 
corn was converted to ethanol.  
 
•  As the rhetoric heightened, and as community after community sought to 
be part of the ethanol expansion, public subsidies in the form of property 
tax breaks started to increase to the point where the newer ethanol plants 
in Iowa are receiving 100 percent tax abatements for 20 years.  State 
subsidies also escalated, even in states that had relatively meager corn 
supplies.  And oddly, states with the highest corn supplies, the places 
where the plants had to locate, ramped up their subsidy packages in an 
effort to grab as many plants and jobs as might be grabbed. 
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•  And last but not least, the future of biofuels is supposedly in the area of 
cellulosic not corn-based systems.  If there is, as promised, a technology 
shift, how might that affect the state’s agricultural sector, its regions, and 
this nascent industry? 
 
Faced with a growing list of concerns about rural development, economic 
impact, environmental factors, and shifts in the character and nature of 
agricultural production in the state of Iowa, we have the task, as policy 
analysts and regional scientists, of helping sort out many of the critical 
elements of the biofuels phenomenon.  First, our basic review of published 
economic impact claims of biofuels trade groups, many state agency studies, 
and even a handful of academic papers told us that the job growth potential 
was severely overstated and ill-described.  State and local policy makers 
were, we concluded, frequently making decisions based on unrealistic 
economic outcomes. 
 
Second, while there are very easily calculable answers as to the number of 
ethanol plants that any large region can accommodate, those findings do not 
tell us where in particular those plants are likely to locate.  There is a strong 
and distinct spatial impact of this whole phenomenon within Iowa, as there is 
strong spatial variation in corn production capacity and in the uses to which 
that corn had been put historically. 
 
Third, ethanol proponents, both political and at the industry level, have 
adopted an “everything will work itself out” response to any claims that this 
rapid expansion will have disruptive effects on other dimensions of 
agricultural production in the state or on the environment.  This tut-tutting of 
those raising issues has likely had a chilling effect on scientific, community, 
and political policy development and debates that might address the 
emerging consequences of this industry. 
 
Fourth, if most of these transformations happen, there will be very real and 
knowable pressures placed on local, regional, and state planning activities.  
Roads and bridges will wear out faster, air and waste-water discharges will 
increase dramatically and have to be monitored, ground water usage and 
depletion will have to be gauged, community planning and land-use 
standards may need to be modified and addressed, and nuisance issues in 
rural areas will have to be re-visited. 
 
We began to address these issues and concerns in earnest with a set of 
research products beginning in mid 2006.  The first concerned wrestling with 
the issue of compiling reliable economic impact summaries of the emerging 
ethanol industry.  That research produced two reports designed to stimulate 
debate and discussion on economic impact issues as well as broad 
corrections to the manner in which we approach and measure this industry.  
As these studies neared completion, and we arrived at sound conclusions 
about the net regional economic gains that an ethanol plant can be expected 
to produce, another set of questions emerged:  
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a.  where would the plants locate ideally (and, importantly, where would 
they not be expected to locate), 
b.  how do existing uses of corn potentially influence plant placement,  
c.  what is the amount of alignment between where the plants would 
ideally locate versus where they are actually locating, and 
d.  what is the upper limit both numerically and spatially to the number of 
plants the study region can accommodate? 
 
Questions a through c led to the development of a GIS-based system 
designed to allocate ethanol plants in Iowa based on the production of corn, 
the existing competition for that corn, and the existence of rail transport 
systems that helped to determine the best choices for plant placements.  
That system then, given the constraints in the model, helps us to get at 
question d. the upper limit of plant development. 
 
Last, and with the aid of this research, we can begin to incrementally or on a 
projection basis identify not only the amount of plant level impacts that 
might accrue, but specifically where and in what sequence they might occur.  
Armed with that knowledge, we can begin to assist policy development and 
planning activity regionally in our state. 
 
 
Phase 1.  Determining the Economic Impact  
Contribution of Ethanol Plants 
 
There is limited economic impact research of the emerging ethanol industry 
in Iowa and in the nation that does not raise analytic eyebrows.  Indeed, 
much of the earlier research relied on by decision makers and biofuels 
advocates was based on poorly specified industrial accounts in modeling 
systems that were not designed to accommodate the modern and rapidly 
expanding ethanol industry, or they resulted from simply applying sets of 
final demand RIMS II – type multipliers to input elements of the industry; in 
both instances leading to a crude, blunt-instrument approach to estimating 




•  Analysts often “created” new jobs in the corn producing sector of the 
economy, along with all existing, multiplied-through impacts, even though 
those jobs were already in the economy. 
 
•  Analysts boosted economic activity in the transportation sectors even 
though the haulage differences between surplus grain (or fed grain 
products) and ethanol were not articulated well, or at the outset evident.  
 
•  Researchers translated price premiums into farmer incomes without 
determining the net regional effects of higher prices on farm income,  
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production costs (as in land rents), or the uses to which that income 
might be put, opting in the main to simply convert the values directly into 
household income gains and consumption. 
 
•  The cost impacts of higher corn prices locally on other corn users or on 
other industries that handle and distribute grain were ignored or the 
economic consequences minimized. 
 
•  The full value of the short-term economic consequences of new plant 
construction were commonly allocated to the rural economy at the 
location of the plant unmindful that the vast majority of the components 
that capitalize an ethanol plant as well as the higher valued engineering, 
architectural, and specialized construction talent inevitably come from 
outside of the region of production.  Further, naïve analysts were prone to 
add construction impacts to ongoing, operational impacts, when reporting 
totals. 
 
•  Most importantly, the cost and revenue structure of modern ethanol 
producing facilities had not been systematically reconciled with the kinds 
of industrial impact modeling systems that are necessary for this kind of 
study. 
 
Our research addressed many of these issues.  It sifted through the analytic 
limits of previous research and created an ethanol impact modeling prototype 
for studying the regional effects of the placement of an ethanol plant.  The 
procedures were quite basic.  Early research at the university level had been 
done compiling enterprise budget information on ethanol plants (Tiffany and 
Eidman, 2003, Tiffany 2005; Jolly, 2006; Shunmugavelu, 2003).  Translating 
that information into input output accounts had not been done, however.  
Some earlier analysis addressed some of these issues (Petersan, 2002; 
Stuefen, 2005; Swenson, 2005), but none to that point had actually 
reconfigured existing input-output systems to align with the enterprise 
budgets for ethanol plants. 
 
Our research, using 2005 cost of production information, translated the 
Tiffany (2005) structure, as modified and applied by Jolly (2006) and 
Shunmugavelu (2003) into IMPLAN to replace the wet milling sector in a 
study region (we could also have replaced the organic chemicals sector, the 
sector where ethanol is properly located, but neither was in use in the region 
of study, so it really didn’t matter).  That research produced a set of reports 
(Swenson, 2006; Swenson and Eathington, 2006) designed to clarify the 





Our research directly confronted the generally limited economic analysis that 
had been conducted by advocates, academics, and government agencies on 
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the regional economic impacts of ethanol in the U.S.  In those reports we 
employed an economic impact definition limited to the net new economic 
product generated in an area beginning with and as a result of ethanol 
industrial direct activity.  We begin with the plant and move forward – we 
ignored backward linkages to a corn production sector that was already in 
existence.  In the main we were most interested in isolating labor incomes 
and jobs attributable to the plant, as these are the elements of most interest 
to local policy makers and affected citizens.  And while construction activity 
can stand out in rural areas, we focus on plant operations and do not 
consider construction effects.  
 
An ethanol plant has important commodity supply requirements.  It needs 
new-to-the-region inputs to convert the existing corn supply into ethanol.
*  
These include natural gas or other fuels, electricity, water, enzymes and 
chemical inputs, perhaps a reconfigured rail distribution system locally, along 
with a host of financial, technical, mechanical, waste discharge, and service 
inputs that keep a modern plant running.  All of these examples constitute 
net new input demands in the region that are directly attributable to the 
placement of the plant in the area.  Hence, the plant creates in indirect 
impact on supplying industries and bolters their sales and their employment. 
 
Last, of course, when workers at the plant and workers in the supplying 
industries receive their pay, they convert it into household spending.  This 
induces a third round of economic activity. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the basic job economic impacts of a 50 Million Gallon 
Per Year (MGY) dry-milling ethanol plant in a three county region of Iowa 
assuming that there was no local ownership in the plant.  The plant required 
36 jobs, it linked to as many as 75 indirect jobs, and the induced bump from 
household spending increases yielded 23 jobs for a total of 134 jobs.   
 
We next scaled our plant sizes up.  While 50 MGY plants were considered 
large just two years ago, nearly all newer plants are closer to 100 MGY in 
size.  Using the same procedures, we then modeled the expected job impacts 
of the larger plants.  Those findings are also displayed in Figure 3 also.  The 
plant required just 10 more direct jobs to double its output.  We assumed 
that a preponderance of the scale economies evident in the plant similarly 
apply to a large fraction of the increases in input supplies (natural gas, water, 
and transportation especially), and that yielded just 20 more indirect jobs.  
Including the six more induced jobs, the 100 MGY plant had a 170 total 
regional job impact.  In doubling the output, the job impacts from plant 
operations only increased by 27 percent. As this industry evolves and 
                                                 
* As the corn already exists and the plant is not altering the overall production of 
agricultural goods in the region (in a situation where the corn is produced in 
surplus), we did not count the corn production as net new regional economic content 
as many of the flawed analyses frequently do. 
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matures in Iowa, there is the expectation that significant scale economies will 




Regional Job Impacts in a 50 MGY and a 













To illustrate this, using the 2006 corn crop as our base and assuming that all 
of the corn that was not fed to animals was processed into ethanol by 50 
MGY capacity ethanol plants, only 70 plants would have been required to do 
the task.
*  The total job impacts under that hypothetical situation would yield 
from 9,000 to 9,500 jobs, assuming minor variations in regional multipliers.  
These results are not the purported tens of thousands claimed by advocates, 
but still a large number of jobs.  If all of the plants were 100 MGY in size, 
had scale economies been achieved broadly, the direction that this industry is 
rapidly taking, it would take only 35 plants and have a total job impact of 
from 5,700 to 6,200 jobs.  The upper limit in Iowa given current corn 
supplies is somewhere between the two ranges, but of late weighing toward 
the latter.  These estimates are future values, we do not yet process 1.5 
billion bushels of corn into ethanol in the state; but we are rapidly 
                                                 
* For those not up on ethanol production factors, the following assumptions were 
used:  Plants produce at 115 percent of their nameplate capacity (or more); hence a 
100 MGY ethanol plant produces 115 MGY of ethanol.  Plants also average about 2.7 
gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn.  For these calculations I assumed that there 
was 1.5 billion bushels of corn available for the ethanol industry in Iowa.    
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approaching the capacity to do so.  That means that we have not achieved 
the job impacts listed above.
** 
 
So there are two simultaneous transformations in Iowa.  First, there is the 
move to larger plants.  It is expected that over time, some of the larger 
plants will overwhelm earlier, smaller, more labor intensive operations.  As 
this industry matures, it will average fewer jobs per million gallons of ethanol 
produced than in the past.  Second, the supply of corn, in the short run at 
least, will increase in the state and nation primarily because of planting 
decisions but also, slowly, through yield improvements.  That means that the 
upper limit on ethanol plants in the state of Iowa is yet to be determined.  In 
order to accommodate those two moving functions, we need to get a better 
handle on the probability of ethanol industry growth in Iowa spatially and to 
build an estimate process that could consider industry changes, production 
changes, and different regional competition-for-corn scenarios. 
 
 
Phase 2.  How Many and Where? 
 
A primary goal of this research was to identify a realistic estimate of the 
potential economic value of the ethanol industry to the state of Iowa.  In Part 
1, we tackled some of the issues involved in determining the average 
impacts of a typical ethanol production facility.  The next step was to identify 
a reasonable upper limit for total statewide production and where that 
production is likely to occur.   
 
The number of viable ethanol plants in Iowa will likely depend on several 
factors, including their spatial distribution across the Iowa landscape and how 
intensively they must compete for inputs.  Variations in soil quality and 
average yields, infrastructure and transport costs, and the level of 
competition for inputs from existing uses for corn are all factors that will 
influence decisions about where ethanol plants will be built and how large 
they will be. 
 
The physical factors influencing the location of new ethanol plants are 
relatively easy to assess.  Other factors, especially those related to human 
behaviors, are not.  As an example, consider the geographic clustering of 
proposed ethanol plants in Figure 1.  The map shows the locations of existing 
and proposed ethanol production facilities at the time our model was built.  
The locations of the 21 proposed plants suggest that competition from 
existing plants was a major consideration.  For example, there were very few 
plants proposed in the eastern part of the state, where several very large, 
wet milling facilities are already in operation.  In contrast, it appears the 
locations of competing proposals for ethanol plants did not serve as a major 
                                                 
** While these are indeed future ethanol plant impact job values, the Renewable Fuels 
Association released a study in March, 2007, claiming that the ethanol industry 
supports the creation of 53,000 jobs throughout the Iowa economy. 
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deterring factor.  In some parts of the state, competing groups were racing 






   
One of the goals of this project was to compare the locations of proposed 
plants with an objectively determined distribution of plants that was based 
solely on physical factors.  A second goal was to identify regions in the state 
that might be headed for a deficit corn supply, assuming that all of the 
proposed plants were actually built.   
 
To obtain the objectively determined geographic distribution of plants, we 
built an application using geographic information systems (GIS) software.  
The GIS application iteratively places new ethanol plants in our region of 
interest until the available corn supply had been exhausted.  Details of the 
model’s construction are described in Appendix B to this report.  Here, we 
limit ourselves to a discussion of our considerations in building the model and 




Our study region included Iowa and neighboring counties within 60 miles of 
Iowa’s borders.  Including the bordering counties allowed us to more 
realistically portray the potential supply regions for ethanol plants in every 
corner of the state.  The set of potential plant locations initially included all 
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The first constraint we introduced into our model was the state’s existing 
transportation infrastructure.  Remote communities that were not situated 
along paved highways or existing rail lines were ruled as ineligible sites for a 
new ethanol facility. 
 
The next constraint was the ability of the 
land to produce corn.  Figure 5 shows which 
regions of the state have the highest average 
corn yields over the last three years.  In general, 
the northern and central regions of the state 
have the best yields.  Southern and eastern 
regions have soil types that are less profitable 
for corn production.   
 
For the third constraint, we considered 
competing uses for the corn.  These 
competing uses included wet corn milling 
operations producing corn sweeteners and other 
products, existing ethanol facilities, and the 
livestock production sector.  The levels of 
demand for corn from the livestock and other 
sectors vary within the state.  Some of the 
state’s best corn producing regions also have 
the highest levels of livestock production, 
especially hogs and poultry.  Figure 6 illustrates, 
for example, the relative density of hog 
production in the study region.   
 
Our goal was not to develop model that reached new equilibrium levels of 
production between ethanol, corn sweetener, and livestock production.  
Rather, we were interested in how much ethanol production could occur in 
the state before existing industries and supplies were substantially disrupted.  
Therefore, the total corn requirements from existing users were simply 
subtracted a priori from regional corn supplies in our model. We are leaving 
existing users whole in this first round of modeling with the option, down the 





After accounting for regional production capacities and existing demands for 
corn, the application of the GIS model involves a simple, iterative process. 
 
1.  Start looping through all potential plant locations. 
2.  For each location, identify a fixed market territory from which a plant 
might obtain corn inputs. 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 
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3.  Calculate the total corn supply available to a new plant by multiplying 
the total area in its circular market territory by the regional average 
density of corn supply. 
4.  Identify the location with the largest available corn supply in its 
market territory. 
5.  Place a plant in that location.  The model allows for two plant sizes to 
be built.  Large, state-of-the-art 100-million gallon plants are placed 
first.  Smaller, 50-million gallon plants are squeezed into regions that 
can sustain them.   
6.  Begin another loop through the potential plant locations. 
 
The model stops looping through potential plant locations when there are no 
remaining locations with large enough regional corn supplies to sustain a 




The map in Figure 7 shows locations where the model suggested new ethanol 
plants in Iowa.  Recall that there were 21 plants in proposal status at the 
time of this project.  Among those 21, there were proposals for three ethanol 
plants at 50-million gallons, one at 80-million gallons, 16 at 100-million 
gallons, and one at 150-million gallons.  Our model placed the same total 
number of plants in the state; however, the combined capacity of these 21 
plants was only 83 percent of the actual proposals.  Just 12 of the model-
placed plants were 100-million gallon plants and 9 were 50-million gallon 
plants.  The location of the proposed plants also differs from the locations 
chosen by the model.  Figure 7 shows the model-proposed and actual 
proposed ethanol plant locations. Notably, the GIS model identified a greater 
number of potential plant locations outside of Iowa than within the state.       
 
Last, Figure 8 demonstrates that after the process has run its course there 
are small areas with corn left over and small areas where demand will exceed 
modeled supplies.  Merely dividing all of the corn in Iowa by the number of 
ethanol plants to process that corn oversimplifies the process and likely over-
estimates the number of plants the state might support.  On the other hand, 
considering the border counties and plant locations in those surrounding 
areas helps us to better predict the likely amount of plant growth in Iowa. 
 
The modeling exercise demonstrated that the number of state-of-the art, 
100-million gallon ethanol plants that can be sustained with a local corn 
supply is lower than the number obtained when spatial competition is 
ignored.  The regional pockets of projected surplus and deficit remaining 
after the modeling exercise suggest that a greater percentage of corn inputs 
for future ethanol plants will likely come from non-local sources.  Increased 
transportation costs and related issues will have implications for the cost 
structures and profitability of the plants. 
 














Certain assumptions and variables within the GIS model’s program can be 
altered.  For example, we can change the average corn yields to account for 
corn breeding technology gains or adverse environmental conditions such as 
drought.  We can also change the buying radius used for determining a 
plant’s market territory.  Finally, we can change the amount of corn 
demanded by the region’s livestock production sector.  Some of the by-
products of ethanol production are already used for livestock feed, and the 
extent to which these by-products will offset feed grain requirements is still 
an open question.   
 
Other factors that may be introduced to the model at a later date include 
constraints on plant location based on the available local water supply and 
constraints due to transport costs. 
 
 
Phase 3.  Implementing the Findings 
 
We are currently in the process of applying our findings.  First, new 
information needs to be entered into our corn supply and demand model.  
Better information on all livestock numbers will be entered to more 
accurately simulate regional grain competition.  Second, since this model was 
initially built and first run there have been several new plant additions along 
with changes in the number of proposed plants.  The model needs to be 
updated to the latest available data.  And last, there are expected sharp 
increases in the amount of corn acres in Iowa.  We would want those 
numbers included to accommodate and shift in corn supplies.  That done we 
will begin to piece together a regionally-specific biofuels economic impact job 




All pertinent state agencies and Iowa State University, our home, are actively 
engaged in the development of the state’s biofuels potential.  There have 
been several large conferences, and the University has developed several 
outreach components, to include web-casts of technical, economic, and other 
research pertinent to this industry. 
 
There are several challenges for research and policy development still 
remaining in Iowa, among which are: 
 
•  Notwithstanding, the rhetoric of sustainable systems, most of the 
economic development activity and community focus is on corn-based 
systems. 
•  The university, while working very hard to position its scientific 
community around the next generation of biofuels research and 
technology transfer, still expends tremendous personal and research 
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resources in supporting and maintaining the existing corn-based 
production system. 
•  Iowa governments, both state and local, are dedicating increasingly 
lucrative, multi-million dollar incentive packages to entice plant locations, 
notwithstanding the paucity of returns to fiscal accounts. 
•  Though economic research is beginning to accumulate that is broadening 
and deepening the discussion of the economic and agri-system 
consequences of biofuels promotion, that research is yet to gain the 
amount of public attention and acceptance that has accumulated from ad 
campaigns from biofuels proponents. 
•  Community meeting opportunities abound where biofuels issues can be 
delivered and discussed, but attendees often have an inflated sense of the 
localized benefits potential of hosting an ethanol plant. 
 
This research demonstrates that there are clear and knowable limits to the 
size and distribution of the ethanol industry as it is currently technologically 
configured in Iowa.  This research has also introduced a modicum of 
nimbleness into the policy assessment and economic development process 
that allows us, as information and conditions warrant, to revisit and 
reconfigure our estimation systems to address both regional and statewide 
issues.  
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Appendix A: A summary of ethanol economic impact issues 
(from Swenson, David.  Input-Outrageous: The Economic Impacts of Modern Biofuels 
Production.  Department of Economics Staff Report.  June, 2006.  Pp. 2 - 4) 
 
Great Expectations or Multiplier Madness: Biofuels Economic Impacts 
 
Those promoting aggressive private and public investment in more biofuels 
processing capacities range from farm commodity groups, farm state 
politicians, many environmental organizations, automobile manufacturers, to 
both right and left wing political orientations.  There are, however, incredible 
ranges of economic activity attributed to biofuels production.  Very little 
appears to be based on rigorous research even though the authors of the 
research often allude to the use of standard national multipliers (produced by 
the U.S. BEA) or input-output models (like Implan).  What follows is just a 
brief sampling of the dimensions of economic expectations from ethanol or 
biofuels production. 
 
Nationally, an Urbanchuck (2005) report using US BEA RIMS II multipliers, 
claimed 114,844 jobs in the national economy depended indirectly on the 
operation of all ethanol plants and the purchases that are made by workers 
(and this does not include ethanol plant employment of perhaps 3,500 to 
4,000, which were not specified in the report).  Corn, a commodity that the 
country overproduced historically (and currently) and is subsidized heavily 
accounts for 85,311 of those jobs.  These results intimate that increased 
ethanol production is expanding the number of farmers and farm related jobs 
in the United States (USDA statistics notwithstanding to the contrary), as 
that is where the vast majority of job impacts are located. 
 
Novack (2002) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City is much more 
expansive, but does not cite her sources.  She reported that “… the [ethanol] 
industry added nearly 200,000 jobs to the U.S. economy.”  This is truly an 
optimistic statement because the U.S. Census Bureau reported that in 2002 
the ethyl-alcohol industry itself in the U.S. had just 2,200 jobs.  She goes on 
to predict that “an additional 214,000 jobs will be created through the 
economy over the next decade.”  Former South Dakota U.S. Senator and 
biofuels advocate Tom Daschle likes Novack’s numbers.  He noted in an 
essay this year (2006) that the current U.S. production of 3.1 billion gallons 
of ethanol created 200,000 jobs. 
 
At the state level, a 2003 Minnesota Department of Agriculture study 
concluded that state’s 356 direct ethanol production jobs created a total of 
2,562 jobs using in this case, Implan, as the basis for its estimation.  More 
robust job multipliers using Implan are found in a recent University of 
Missouri Extension report (2006).  It concluded just 4 plants employing 154 
persons in the state accounted for 2,784 total jobs – a hefty jobs multiplier of 
18.  In Evans’s, 1997, work for the Midwest Governors’ Conference, the 
author figured that 800 total jobs in ethanol production in Iowa alone 
sparked an increase of 5,800 jobs in machinery manufacturing in the state 
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and 33,900 additional jobs related to the enhancement of farm income for a 
jobs multiplier of 51.   
 
A Des Moines Register story in April of 2006 quoted an industry advocate 
from an organization called BIOWA claiming that 10 new bio-refinery plants 
in Iowa would create 22,000 jobs.   That advocate cites a University of 
Northern Iowa study in support of those figures, but he could not produce a 
copy of that research when asked.   Iowa’s Soybean Association announced 
in March of 2006 that it had done a study in which they predict soy biodiesel 
will add $1.3 billion in income to the state and 15,000 jobs, although one 
cannot obtain their study via their press linkages.    
 
In very stark contrast to this numerical enthusiasm, there are other reports 
that provide markedly lower estimates of job impacts for Iowa.  A 2006 
(Imerman and Otto) report on energy supply and usage in Iowa contained a 
table on the economic impacts of 800 million gallons of ethanol in Iowa 
produced for export.  That table is more modest compared to previous 
estimates and concluded that 2,400 total jobs were impacted by the industry 
(outside of corn production) in the production of those export sales.  That 
analysis and conclusion were reached by a university researcher and 
professor in a different university in Iowa who has a good sense of input 
output analysis, especially in value added agricultural situations.      
 
There are reports by researchers linked to agribusiness that are much more 
modest in their expectations.  In the Stueffen (2005) report produced for the 
South Dakota Corn Growers Association, the author removes the corn inputs 
from his impact calculations – a step in the right direction as the corn was 
already produced in his study area.  Just on the ethanol side, this author 
concluded that 473 direct jobs were tied to 2,972 jobs in the state economy.  
Another more modest finding was produced by Petersan (2002) of the 
Nebraska Public Power District.  Noting that “the existence of this facility will 
not result in the production of additional agricultural products within the 
study area…” Petersan found that an 80 MGY plant in an rural Nebraska area 
would require 48 direct workers and would link to just 163 total jobs in the 
rural regional economy, and my earlier effort (Swenson 2005) in this area 
using a wet mill configuration aligned closely with the Petersan example.   
 
The attached graph shows some of the different job multipliers that were 
discerned from these research reports by the analytical foundation for the 
estimates (RIMS II or Implan).   They ranged from a low of just 3.4 for one 
plant in Nebraska (Petersan), to over 50 in the case of Evans’s estimate for 
the state of Iowa.  
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Estimated Jobs Multipliers in Ethanol Studies






































 21 / 31 
  22
Appendix B:  Technical summary of the GIS-based 
ethanol plant location simulation model 
 
(from Eathington, Liesl and David Swenson.  Ethanol Plant Locations in Iowa - 
GIS Modeling Exercise.  Department of Economics Staff Report.  June, 2006) 
 
Purpose 
With this modeling exercise, we are simulating the construction of new ethanol plants 
in Iowa to determine the number and placement of plants to would minimize regional 
competition for corn and transport distances for corn inputs. their demand for corn 
disrupts the current framework of corn and livestock production decisions. 
 
We use a GIS application that selects optimal locations for new ethanol plants based 
on the availability of corn within a defined geographic territory surrounding a 
potential location.  Current levels of local demand for corn for livestock feed and 
existing wet and dry milling plants are factored into the model.  The GIS application 
iteratively places new plants until the supply of available corn in the study region no 
longer meets threshold level required to sustain additional plants. 
 
Study Region Definition 
The study region includes Iowa counties and bordering counties within 60 miles (237 
counties in total) 
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Potential Plant Locations 






 23 / 31 
  24
Local Corn Supply and Livestock Demand for Corn 
The amount of corn available for any potential plant location is based on regionally-
specific average densities of corn supply and demand.  We estimate these densities 
using county-level data for:    
 
•  Average corn yield in bushels per acre (weighted average for 2003-2005) 
•  Average crop acres per square mile (2002 Census of Agriculture),  
•  Percentage of crop acres in corn (2002) 
•  Average number of hogs and cattle per square mile (2002).   
 
We use a GIS interpolation procedure to spread these county average values over 
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For each supply node, we estimate the total bushels of corn produced and the amount of 
corn demanded for livestock feed.  Corn supply and demand at each node as calculated as 
follows:  
 
•  Total corn supply in bushels = average crop acre density * average corn acre 
percent * average corn yield * square miles in township 
•  Hog demand in bushels = average hog density * square miles in township * 30 
bushels per year 
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•  Dairy demand in bushels = average dairy density * square miles in township * 71 
bushels per year * 80 percent 
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Demand from Existing Wet and Dry-Milling Plants 
Corn requirements for existing or planned plants are subtracted from regional 
supplies as follows. 
 
•  For each existing plant or plant currently under construction, a minimum required 
geographic supply area is determined.  This minimum area is based on the plant’s 
total corn requirements in bushels, average regional yields, corn acreage, and 
estimated local corn demand for livestock feed. 
•  90 percent of each plant’s requirements are spread evenly throughout the 
surrounding region, with a buying radius 1.25 percent larger than the minimum 
required radius.   
•  For each supply node falling within the purchasing territory, the plant’s 
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New Plant Locations 
After accounting for corn demanded by existing plants and livestock, the model 
begins searching for new plant locations. 
 
•  The model creates a 30-mile buffer zone surrounding each potential new plant 
location.  
•  It assesses the available corn supply within each buffered zone until the location 
with the greatest supply is identified. 
•  The model places a new ethanol plant in that location. 100-million gallon plants 
are placed first, then 50-million gallon plants. 
•  The new plant’s requirements are subtracted from the available supply. 
•  The program loops until no buffered region contains enough corn to sustain a 50-
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Model Results 
The baseline model begins with the following estimates for available corn supply within 
the 237-county study region: 
•  total corn supply of 4,185,501,988 bushels 
•  hogs and dairy cattle requirements of 766,562,259 bushels  (18 percent) of the 
total supply 
•  available supply of 3,418,939,730 bushels for ethanol production, other milling, 
or export 
 
The model next satisfies demand from 36 wet and dry-milling facilities in operation or 
under construction (reflecting information available as of May 31, 2006).  
 
New plants are placed in 61 locations (21 in Iowa)   
•  35 @ 100-million gallons (12 in Iowa) 
•  32 @ 50-million gallons (9 in Iowa) 
 
After the modeling exercise, 480,000,000 bushels of corn remain in the study territory.  
This represents roughly 11 percent of the original available supply.  However, the model 
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